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In this paper, we aim at contributing to the new field of research that intends to bring up-to-date 
the tools and statistics currently used to look to the current reality given by Global Value Chains (GVC) in 
international trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Namely, we make use of the most recent data 
published by the World Input-Output Database to suggest indicators to measure the participation and net 
gains of countries by being a part of GVC; and use those indicators in a pooled-regression model to estimate 
determinants of FDI stocks in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-member 
countries. We conclude that one of the measures proposed proves to be statistically significant in explaining 
the bilateral stock of FDI in OECD countries, meaning that the higher the transnational income generated 
between two given countries by GVC, taken as a proxy to the participation of those countries in GVC, the 
higher one could expect the FDI entering those countries to be. The regression also shows the negative 
impact of the global financial crisis that started in 2009 in the world’s bilateral FDI stocks and, additionally, 
the particular and significant role played by the People’s Republic of China in determining these stocks. 
 
Keywords: International fragmentation of production, Globalization, Global Value Chains, Foreign Direct 
Investment, Pooled-regression model 
 












This paper globally aims at adding empirical contributes on one of the meaningful changes that 
had emerged in recent times due to the globalization, namely the so-called Global Value Chains (GVC), 
defined as worldwide production processes where fragmented production blocks are connected by service 
links. 
This globalization posed a new reality and new challenges that needs to be addressed by policy 
makers and researchers. Before 1985, successful industrialization meant building a domestic supply chain. 
Today, in the face of the regional dispersion of productions stages, industrialisers join supply chains and 
grow rapidly because off shored production brings elements that normally take decades to develop 
domestically. As main consequences, trade in intermediate goods has come to dominate world merchandise 
trade, trade politics changed, geography of manufacturing is now different, and it becomes clear that 
traditional trade statistics and measure fail to properly reflect the current complexity of international trade. 
First, international fragmentation of production has become increasingly prominent since the 
1990s and the associated cross-border trade in intermediate goods has come to dominate world merchandise 
trade (see Arndt and Kierzkowski 2001; Cheng and Kierzkowski 2001). Empirical data show that, already 
in 2005, trade in intermediates accounted for about 60% of the USD 20 trillion annual global trade (56% in 
the case of goods and 73% in the case of services) (Mirodout et al. 2009)1. 
Second, trade politics changed, as pointed out by Lamy (2010). Developing countries, which had 
resisted to trade and investment liberalization until the end of the 1980s, started to open, mostly to facilitate 
international production sharing. Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013) show that tariffs were slashed 
unilaterally in all regions, particularly on intermediates; that pro-supply chain agreements blossomed, such 
as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) (mostly about unilateral concessions to attract investment from 
developed nations); and that the number of deep provisions in new Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) 
(referring to provisions that are pro-supply-chain, such as competition policy, capital movements, and 
assurances for intellectual property) increased significantly in the first decade of the 21st century. As a 
consequence, annual FDI flows increased from around USD 200 billion in 1988 to USD 2 trillion in 2007. 
Third, geography of manufacturing is now different, as showed by Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez 
(2013). A major revolution was observed in the relative weigh of the largest manufacturers. In 1970, US, 
Germany and Japan alone accounted for 52% of global manufacturing share. From 1990 to 2010, the 
relative weigh of the G7 economies had dropped from 65% to 46% of global manufacturing share (18 
percentage points). People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s weigh increased in the same period by 16 
percentage points. Only six other nations saw their world shares rise by more than half percentage point 
between 1970 and 2010: India, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey and Poland. Additionally, the 
shift in manufacturing followed a strong geographical dimension, with a clear focus on East Asia. In fact, 
in PRC and South Korea, the world’s largest exporters of electronic goods in 2009, the foreign content of 
exports of these products was about 40%, according to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) (2013). Finally, a revolutionary aspect is that 
this supply chain trade happens between high-tech and low-wage nations, meaning North-South production 
sharing2. 
Fourth, traditional trade statistics and measure fail to properly reflect the current complexity of 
international trade. With the globalization of production, awareness grew that conventional trade statistics 
may give a misleading perspective of the importance of trade and that «what you see is not what you get» 
(Maurer and Degain, 2010). Traditional measures of trade flows exaggerate the volume of total exports and 
imports because they involve double counting. UNCTAD (2013) concludes in this regard that 28% of the 
value of world cross-border trade in goods and services in 2010 (or about USD 5 trillion) was overstated as 
a result of double and triple counting. Many goods require the use of other imported goods and materials 
to make them, but those inputs are not discounted when export volumes are calculated. Following OECD 
and WTO (2013), let’s suppose a world with three countries: A, B and C. Country A exports USD 100 of 
goods produced entirely within A to country B, which further processes them before exporting them to 
country C where they are consumed. B adds value of USD 10 to the goods and so exports USD 110 to C. 
Conventional measures of trade show total global exports and imports of USD 210, but only USD 110 of 
                                                 
1 Other empirical studies also produced similar results. Feenstra (1998) robustly concluded for several indicators that OECD countries 
generally observed between the 1970s and the 1990s an increase in the utilization of imported inputs and a reduction in domestic 
inputs. Yi (2003) concluded that at least half of the increase in international trade observed since the 60s can be explained by vertical 
specialization. Yeats (2001) and Hummels et al. (2001) concluded that vertical specialization was responsible for nearly 30% of global 
trade in manufactures in 1995. Jones et al. (2005) and Athukorala and Yamashita (2006) showed that de dynamism and growth rates 
observed in parts and components has persistently out passed the one observed in final goods for the last decades. 
2 Meng et al, (2010) show for OECD and emerging economies, from 1995 and 2005, a positive correlation between the exporting 
orientation of a giving country and its dependence on imported intermediate goods.  
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value-added has been generated in their production. Conventional measures also show that C has a trade 
deficit of USD 110 with B, and no trade at all with A, despite the fact that A is the major beneficiary of C’s 
consumption. If we would track trade flows in value-added instead, C’s deficit with B reduces to USD 10 
and it now runs a deficit of USD 100 with A. A well-discussed empirical study of what we mean is the 
study by Xing and Detert (2010) on the trade in value added of Apple’s iPhone. 
And fifth, the link between investment and trade becomes stronger. UNCTAD (2013) estimates 
that value chains administered by multinational enterprises account for 80% of global trade, showing that 
global investment and trade are thoroughly entwined through international production networks. 
To overcome that fact that old statistics of international trade fail to fully reflect that new reality 
that globalization created - from “made in one country” to “made in the world”; from “trade in goods” to 
“trade in tasks”; and from “value of trade” to “trade in value added”- , recently several organizations 
published important new databases on value-added statistics for international trade, based on international 
input-output (IO) tables with bilateral trade links3. The revolutionary character of these new databases 
comes from the fact that they group goods and services in inputs and final demand according to the use 
they have in the economy, whereas other methodologies group goods and services in inputs and final 
demand relying on standard classification of each product (regardless of the way the product was actually 
used). This difference is crucial, since most kinds of products and services are usually used for both 
purposes, i.e. as intermediates and as a final consumption.  
We point out the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), coordinated by the University of 
Groningen, launched on April 16, 2012 (see Timmer et al. 2015), covering 40 countries4 and 35 sectors. 
This new public data source offers unique opportunities to study the effects of fragmentation on a range of 
socioeconomic and environmental issues. The core of the database is a set of harmonized supply and use 
tables, alongside with data on international trade in goods and services. These two sets of data have been 
integrated into sets of intercountry (world) IO tables, which are complemented by extensive satellite 
accounts with environmental and socio-economic indicators, such as industry-level data of capital stock, 
investment, wages and employment by skill type. Other IO databases have been published following 
WIOD. A comparative listing of those databases is presented in Table 1 below. We make use of WIOD in 
our study as it has been the database most widely used by researchers so far.  
 
TABLE 1 
COMPARATIVE LISTING OF SCOPE AND REACH OF THE INTERNATIONALLY-LINKED IO DATABASES 
PUBLISHED AS PER 30 JUNE 2016 
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40 35 1995 to 
2011 
Based on official 
National Accounts 
statistics; uses end-use 
classification to 
allocate flows across 
partner countries; 











56 18 1995, 2000, 
2005, 2008, 
and 2009 
Based on national I-O 


























129 57 2004, 2007 Unofficial dataset; 
includes data on areas 
such as energy 
volumes, land use, 
carbon dioxide 
                                                 
3 For a comprehensive explanation of the basic structure of an IO table, also known as supply and use table, see Wixted et al. (2006). 
4 Namely Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Malta, the Netherlands, 






























Contributing to this new field of research, we will make use of the most recent data published by 
the WIOD to suggest two indicators of measuring the participation and the net gains of countries joining 
GVC in terms of income (section 2). Second, we will build in section 3 a pooled-regression model 
explaining bilateral FDI stock between countries. In this model, we will make use of explanatory variables 
usually found in the literature to empirically explain FDI flows and also the two income-related indexes 
proposed in section 2, which introduce the GCV-related character of the model. Lastly, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Measuring the impact of Global Value Chains for countries 
 
In this section, we will use the WIOD database coordinated by the University of Groningen to build two 
indicators that help measuring the impact of GVC for the 40 countries considered in this database, both of 
them related to income appropriation. Namely, we propose an “Income measure of country embeddedness 
in GVC (GVC income country embeddedness, in short) and an “Income measure of net country gains from 
participating in GVC” (GVC income country net gains, in short) and apply them to the 40 selected 
economies. Then, we compare these new proposed measures to those previously suggested in the literature. 
  
2.1. The GVC income country embeddedness measure 
 
The first measure proposed adds the appropriation of a given economy’s income by foreign agents 
and that given economy’s appropriation of income due to demand by foreign agents.  
EMBINCO (see Index 1 below) is the income measure of country embeddedness of participating in 
GVC, where i refers to a given country i, GAININCO refers to the sum of the income of other countries 
appropriated by country i due to the demand for country i’s products and services used as inputs in the 
production processes of foreign agents (in USD), LOSTINCO refers to the sum of the country i’s income 
appropriated by all n foreign agents due to the use by country i of foreign inputs in its production processes 
(in USD) and OUTPUT refers to the total value of the domestic production of country i at basic prices. 
 
INDEX 1 
THE INCOME MEASURE OF COUNTRY EMBEDDEDNESS 
∑ , ∑ ,
 
 
The results are as it follows (see Table 2 below). Luxembourg is the economy (within the set of 40 
countries assessed here) more relatively embedded in GVC. The income transferred to and from 
Luxembourg due to its participation in GVCs equals almost 87% of the total output of the economy (at 
prices5). Other countries where that transfer represents at least half of their domestic output are Ireland 
(58%) and Hungary (53%).  
TABLE 2 














Luxembourg 160.6 76.2 63.1 139.3 86.7% 
                                                 
5 The basic price is the amount receivable by the producer exclusive of taxes payable on products and inclusive of subsidies receivable 
on products (the equivalent for imported products is the c.i.f. - cost, insurance and freight - value, that is, the value at the border of the 




Ireland 477.1 147.4 131.4 278.8 58.4% 
Hungary 309.4 87.1 78.0 165.1 53.4% 
Taiwan 1,052.8 298.2 225.2 523.4 49.7% 
Belgium 1,113.9 275.0 249.4 524.4 47.1% 
Czech Rep. 532.2 128.8 112.0 240.8 45.2% 
Malta 17.7 4.1 3.7 7.8 44.1% 
Netherlands 1,659.0 384.1 324.6 708.7 42.7% 
Slovakia 214.4 46.9 40.9 87.7 41.0% 
Austria 811.2 171.5 128.1 299.6 36.9% 
Lithuania 73.5 13.9 12.8 26.7 36.3% 
Estonia 43.2 8.7 6.7 15.4 35.6% 
Slovenia 97.4 18.5 15.6 34.1 35.0% 
Denmark 600.4 112.1 94.0 206.1 34.3% 
South Korea 2,877.4 519.5 443.1 962.6 33.5% 
Sweden 1,036.3 201.7 142.2 343.9 33.2% 
Finland 530.1 89.8 72.6 162.4 30.6% 
Germany 6,773.1 1,248.6 813.0 2,061.6 30.4% 
Bulgaria 116.9 17.5 17.9 35.4 30.3% 
Poland 1,049.9 157.8 155.2 313.0 29.8% 
Mexico 1,954.5 283.1 226.8 509.9 26.1% 
Latvia 55.4 7.8 6.4 14.2 25.6% 
Romania 361.1 39.3 42.4 81.7 22.6% 
Canada 3,184.5 427.9 289.9 717.8 22.5% 
UK 4,419.1 542.6 416.9 959.5 21.7% 
Cyprus 39.4 3.1 4.9 8.0 20.3% 
Indonesia 1,658.8 184.8 147.6 332.4 20.0% 
Italy 4,278.9 419.6 423.4 843.0 19.7% 
Portugal 439.5 39.7 45.5 85.2 19.4% 
France 5,070.1 501.5 460.1 961.6 19.0% 
Spain 2,905.0 266.4 282.1 548.5 18.9% 
Russia 3,262.7 448.2 138.4 586.6 18.0% 
Greece 453.2 30.7 47.1 77.8 17.2% 
Australia 2,844.6 289.3 173.7 463.0 16.3% 
Turkey 1,418.5 105.3 113.2 218.5 15.4% 
PRC 22,271.0 1,515.3 1,476.6 2,991.9 13.4% 
India 3,609.8 209.8 269.7 479.5 13.3% 
Japan 11,333.4 743.3 596.2 1,339.5 11.8% 
US 26,918.1 1,503.3 1,450.6 2,953.9 11.0% 
Brazil 4,001.1 236.3 198.7 435.0 10.9% 
Source: Authors estimations based on WIOD, retrieved in January 2014. 
 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, Brazil and USA emerge as the least relatively embedded 
economies in GVCs, as the transfers of income in which they are involved due to their participation in these 
chains merely represent 11% of their domestic output. 
 
2.2. The GVC income country net gains measure 
 
The second measure proposed just subtracts the appropriation of a given economy’s income by 
foreign agents to that given economy’s appropriation of income due to demand by foreign agents. 
 GOODINCO(see Index 2 below) is the income measure of country net gains from participating in 
GVC, where i refers to a given country i, GAININCO refers to the sum of the income of other countries 
appropriated by country i due to the demand for country i’s products and services to be used as inputs in 
the production processes of foreign agents (in US dollars), LOSTINCO refers to the sum of the country i’s 
income appropriated by all n foreign agents due to the use by country i of foreign inputs in its production 





THE INCOME MEASURE OF GOODNESS 





The results are shown in Table 3 below. Russia appears as the economy (of the set of 40 countries 
assessed here) with higher gains obtained from participating in GVCs. In 2011, total exports of goods and 
services used as inputs by other countries represented USD 448 billion, while total imports of goods and 
services used as inputs in the Russian economy amounted to USD 138 billion. Annual gain sums USD 310 
billion therefore. This finding is critically influenced however by the weight of Petroleum and Gas in the 
Russian exports, as these two commodities are widely used as inputs in the production processes of goods 
and services of its main trade partners (Russian petroleum and gas was the main input in the economy in 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Finland, Italy and Greece in 2011, accounting for 7%, 3%, 2%, 1% and 1% of those 
countries’ total output, respectively). Apart from Russia, Luxembourg and Taiwan are the most benefited 
economy in relative terms, i.e. according to GOODINCO. In absolute terms, i.e. considering the difference 
between GAININCO and LOSTINCO, Germany shows up as the most benefited country. The difference 
between the foreign output appropriated by German agents and the German output appropriated by foreign 
agents amounted to USD 435 billion in 2011. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Greece and India emerge 
as the less benefiting countries in relative and absolute terms, respectively. The foreign output appropriated 
by Indian agents was USD 60 billion lower than the Indian output appropriated by foreign agents in 2011. 
That difference amounted to 4.6% of total domestic output in the case of Greece.  
One should bear in mind that this analysis does not take into consideration other impacts of 
belonging to GVCs, such as gains from technology transfer, efficiency in the allocation of resources or the 
final impact in the country’s trade balance.  
TABLE 3 













Russia 3,262.7 448.2 138.4 309.8 9.5% 
Luxembourg 160.6 76.2 63.1 13.1 8.2% 
Taiwan 1,052.8 298.2 225.2 73.0 6.9% 
Germany 6,773.1 1,248.6 813.0 435.6 6.4% 
Sweden 1,036.3 201.7 142.2 59.5 5.7% 
Austria 811.2 171.5 128.1 43.4 5.4% 
Estonia 43.2 8.7 6.7 2.0 4.6% 
Canada 3,184.5 427.9 289.9 138.0 4.3% 
Australia 2,844.6 289.3 173.7 115.6 4.1% 
Netherlands 1,659.0 384.1 324.6 59.5 3.6% 
Ireland 477.1 147.4 131.4 16.0 3.4% 
Finland 530.1 89.8 72.6 17.2 3.2% 
Czech Rep. 532.2 128.8 112.0 16.8 3.2% 
Denmark 600.4 112.1 94.0 18.1 3.0% 
Slovenia 97.4 18.5 15.6 2.9 3.0% 
Hungary 309.4 87.1 78.0 9.1 2.9% 
Mexico 1,954.5 283.1 226.8 56.3 2.9% 
UK 4,419.1 542.6 416.9 125.7 2.8% 
Slovakia 214.4 46.9 40.9 6.0 2.8% 
South Korea 2,877.4 519.5 443.1 76.4 2.7% 
Latvia 55.4 7.8 6.4 1.4 2.5% 
Belgium 1,113.9 275.0 249.4 25.6 2.3% 
Malta 17.7 4.1 3.7 0.4 2.3% 
Indonesia 1,658.8 184.8 147.6 37.2 2.2% 
Lithuania 73.5 13.9 12.8 1.1 1.5% 
Japan 11,333.4 743.3 596.2 147.1 1.3% 
Brazil 4,001.1 236.3 198.7 37.6 0.9% 
France 5,070.1 501.5 460.1 41.4 0.8% 
Poland 1,049.9 157.8 155.2 2.6 0.2% 
US 26,918.1 1,503.3 1,450.6 52.7 0.2% 
PRC 22,271.0 1,515.3 1,476.6 38.7 0.2% 
Italy 4,278.9 419.6 423.4 -3.8 -0.1% 
Bulgaria 116.9 17.5 17.9 -0.4 -0.3% 
Spain 2,905.0 266.4 282.1 -15.7 -0.5% 
Turkey 1,418.5 105.3 113.2 -7.9 -0.6% 
Romania 361.1 39.3 42.4 -3.1 -0.9% 
Portugal 439.5 39.7 45.5 -5.8 -1.3% 
India 3,609.8 209.8 269.7 -59.9 -1.7% 
Greece 453.2 30.7 47.1 -16.4 -3.6% 
Cyprus 39.4 3.1 4.9 -1.8 -4.6% 




Of course this same indicator could be replicated for pairs of countries. For this estimation, we 
substitute the total output (OUTPUT) for the sum of income existing domestically due to foreign demand 
(sum of A), aiming just at having a change in scale that avoids ending up with too small numbers. As a case 
in point, let’s just take the Portuguese case (see Table 4 below). Clearly, Portuguese income benefits the 
most from demand for inputs originated in Sweden, United States, and France, while it losses the most due 
to domestic demand for foreign inputs produced in Brazil, the Netherlands and, particularly, Spain.  
 
TABLE 4 
THE DISAGGREGATED INCOME MEASURE OF COUNTRY NET GAINS FROM PARTICIPATING IN GLOBAL 
VALUE CHAINS FOR PORTUGAL (2009) 








France 3.77 2.38 1.39 3.5% 
US 2.95 2.11 0.84 2.1% 
Sweden 0.54 0.28 0.27 0.7% 
Poland 0.36 0.19 0.17 0.4% 
Turkey 0.26 0.10 0.16 0.4% 
Czech Rep. 0.31 0.17 0.15 0.4% 
Ireland 0.53 0.41 0.12 0.3% 
Austria 0.46 0.34 0.11 0.3% 
Romania 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.3% 
Australia 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.2% 
Finland 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.1% 
Greece 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.1% 
Hungary 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.1% 
Mexico 0.33 0.31 0.02 0.0% 
Slovenia 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.0% 
Slovakia 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.0% 
Cyprus 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.0% 
Latvia 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.0% 
Estonia 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.0% 
Canada 0.31 0.30 0.00 0.0% 
Malta 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.0% 
Japan 0.19 0.20 -0.01 0.0% 
Denmark 0.16 0.17 -0.02 0.0% 
Lithuania 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.0% 
Taiwan 0.04 0.07 -0.03 -0.1% 
Bulgaria 0.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.1% 
Belgium 1.23 1.29 -0.06 -0.2% 
Indonesia 0.02 0.11 -0.08 -0.2% 
Germany 4.35 4.44 -0.09 -0.2% 
Luxembourg 0.06 0.22 -0.16 -0.4% 
UK 1.71 1.89 -0.18 -0.5% 
India 0.08 0.27 -0.19 -0.5% 
South Korea 0.04 0.24 -0.20 -0.5% 
Russia 0.19 0.41 -0.22 -0.5% 
Rest of the World 7.69 7.97 -0.28 -0.7% 
PRC 0.69 1.04 -0.35 -0.9% 
Italy 1.43 2.02 -0.58 -1.5% 
Brazil 1.62 2.29 -0.66 -1.7% 
Netherlands 0.98 1.71 -0.73 -1.8% 
Spain 8.72 14.04 -5.32 -13.3% 
Total 39.84 45.46 -5.6 - 





2.3. Comparing the proposed indicators with those previously suggested in the literature 
 
We will now compare the main innovative aspects of the indexes proposed in the previous sections 
with the most commonly used indicators found in the literature so far, namely Feenstra and Hanson (1996)’s 
and Feenstra (1998)’s index of international outsourcing; Hummels et al. (1998)’s and Hummels et al. 
(2001)’s index of vertical specialization; Guerrieri and Caffarelli (2004)’s index of revealed comparative 
advantages for intermediate goods; Baldone et al. (2007)’s index of relative propensity revealed to 
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internationally fragmented production; Amador and Cabral (2009)’s index of relative vertical 
specialization; Dullien (2010)’s index of relative importance of international trade of parts and components; 
Meng et al. (2010, 2011)’s index of re-exported imported intermediate goods; Ferrarini (2011)’s network 
trade index between a pair of countries; and Yamano et al. (2011)’s indexes of import content of exports, 
of re-exported exports in intermediates and of a given country’s exports embedded in its trade partners’ 
exports. 
Firstly, while the indexes proposed in this paper put two approaches (downstream and upstream) 
together, the indexes found in literature merely cover a downstream approach . While the downstream 
approach (also known as supplier’s approach) provides us with a partial idea of how embedded in GVC is 
a given economy by telling us how much foreign production is incorporated as inputs into its production, 
the upstream approach (also known as user’s approach) provides us with the other partial information 
missing to get the full picture of how embedded in GVC is a given economy by telling us how much the 
production of that given economy is used as inputs in the production processes of other countries. Secondly, 
the measures that we present are based on the actual use of the goods and services as inputs in the production 
process and not in its classification as intermediate or final goods or services, as it is the case of previous 
indexes Thirdly, we estimate income transfers between countries to assess GVC participation, instead of 
typically assessing it by means of trade flows. These three innovative aspects of the proposed indicators 
directly derivate from the utilization of internationally-linked IO databases. 
 
 
3. The Link Between Global Value Chains and the Investment of Countries 
 
In this section, we test the impact of the two income-related indexes proposed in a pooled regression 
model that analyses the bilateral FDI stocks between 37 OECD members of the WIOD database coordinated 
by the University of Groningen that are also covered by OECD (2014)’s database of outward bilateral FDI 
stock6.  
A vast empirical literature has been developed determining the forces attracting FDI, most of them 
making use of cross-country regressions to search for empirical linkages between FDI and a variety of 
economic variables. For instance, this literature shows that for most variables, observed effect is ambiguous, 
as summarized by Chakrabarti (2001) and complemented by Onyeiwu (2003) and Jabri et al. (2013).  
We will run a pooled-regression model explaining bilateral FDI stock between countries in the 
period ranging 2002 to 2012. In this model, we will make use of explanatory variables usually found in the 
literature to empirically explain FDI flows plus the two income-related indexes EMBINCO and 
GOODINCO (see Index 3 below).  
INDEX 3 
POOLED-REGRESSION MODEL FOR BILATERAL FDI STOCK 
, α+β1.	 +β2.	 +β3.	 +β4.	 + 
+β5.	 +β6.	 +β7.	 , +β8.	 , +β9.	 _ , + 
+ β10.	 , +β11.	 , +β12.	 , +β13.	 , + 




The variables included in the model are the following: 
 
Dependent variable 
,  is the outward bilateral FDI stock in year t from country j to country i, current prices, in 
million US dollars; t ranges from 2002 to 2012; j is the reporting country and i is the partner country. The 
number of observations is 10,968 (non-negative, non-zero and non-confidential observations). It makes use 
of the third edition of the OECD’s benchmark definition of FDI, which includes all sorts of transnational 
                                                 
6 The 37 countries covered by the WIOD that are also covered by (2014) are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, PRC, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. Latvia, Lithuania, and Taiwan are not included in this study, as OECD (2014) 
does not present data for them. 
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financial flows, productive or speculative, short or long run and data was retrieved on 10 October 2015 
from OECD (2015).  
 
Independent variables 
1.  and  are the nominal GDP per capita of country j and i, respectively, 
current prices, in US dollars, retrieved from World Bank (2015a), complemented for selected countries 
with Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015) and Kurshnir (2015).  
2.  and  are the nominal GDP of country j and i, respectively, current prices, in 
US dollars, retrieved from World Bank (2015a), complemented for selected countries with Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (2015) and Kurshnir (2015). 
According to Chakrabarti (2001, p. 96), market size has, by far, been the single most widely accepted 
as a significant determinant of FDI flows. The market size hypothesis upholds that a large market is 
necessary for efficient utilization of resources and exploitation of economies of scale: as the market-size 
grows to some critical value, FDI will start to increase thereafter with its further expansion.» This 
hypothesis has been rather popular and a variable representing market size has appeared as an explanatory 
variable in nearly all empirical studies on the determinants of FDI. Those empirical studies use as main 
explanatory variables GDP, GNP, and, mostly, GDP or GNP per capita. 
3.  and  are the sum of imports and exports divided by the 
nominal GDP of country i and j, respectively, current prices, in US dollars. Exports are imports are retrieved 
from World Bank (2015b) and complemented with The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2016).  
Chakrabarti (2001, p. 99) explains that, for openness, «there is mixed evidence regarding the 
significance of openness measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP in determining FDI». The 
hypothesis is that a country’s degree of openness to international trade should be a relevant factor in the 
decision, given that most investment projects are directed towards the tradable sector. Authors report 
ambiguous results though. We will produce our own empirical evidence in this regard. 
In addition, we also include in the regression several variables that work as proxies for the 
transaction costs to invest: 
4. ,  is the geodesic weighted distance as the crow flies between country i and country 
j (weighted using city-level data to assess the geographic distribution of population, in 2004, inside each 
nation)7, in kilometers, retrieved on 24 August 2015 from Mayer and Zignago (2011)8. 
5. ,  is a dummy variable indicating whether the two countries are contiguous, i.e. 
if they share a land border, retrieved on 24 August 2015 from Mayer and Zignago (2011).  
6. _ ,  is a dummy variable indicating whether the two countries share the 
same official language, retrieved on 24 August 2015 from Mayer and Zignago (2011).  
7. ,  is a dummy variable indicating whether the two countries have ever had a 
colonial link, retrieved on 24 August 2015 from Mayer and Zignago (2011).  
The explanatory variables , , , , _ , , and ,  are broadly 
considered proxies for “trade barriers”. Ceteris paribus, the higher the distance between the two countries 
involved in the bilateral FDI stock, one can assume that the smaller is the cultural, legal, and historical 
familiarity between the two countries. In the same vein, if the two countries share a land border, the same 
language, or used to be the colony one of the other, one could assume that the higher is the cultural, legal, 
and historical familiarity between the two countries. This familiarity could be interpreted as an element 
reducing transaction costs in trade and investment, so easing FDI flows between those two countries. 
In the case of , , its effect can nonetheless be considered ambiguous, as it depends on the 
prevailing type of FDI (positive for horizontal FDI, aligned with the tariff-jumping motive of FDI; negative 
for vertical FDI). However, a negative sign is usually obtained in the empirical literature irrespective of the 
type of FDI, confirming the overall negative effect of distance as a measure of trade costs. This negative 
effect is also valid as a proxy of investment costs, since restrictions on FDI discourage all foreign investors, 
implying an expected negative coefficient regardless of the FDI type. 
                                                 
7 «The basic idea, inspired by Head and Mayer (2002), is to calculate distance between two countries based on bilateral distances 
between the biggest cities of those two countries, those inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the city in the overall 
country’s population», in Mayer and Zignago (2011, p. 11). 
8 The GeoDist Database presents the caveat that Belgium and Luxembourg are considered as one country, so we modified the database 
to include the geodesic distance between Brussels and Luxembourg. 
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 We also include in the regression an explanatory variable to test the sensitivity of FDI bilateral 
stocks to offshore financial centers: 
8. ,  is a dummy variable indicating whether at least one of the two countries 
is considered to be an offshore financial center, following IMF (2015)9. One should expect this variable to 
be positively related to the bilateral stocks of FDI between countries, since the OECD’s definition of FDI 
not only includes productive and medium- and long-term investments, but also speculative and short-term 
investments, the latter being sensitive and positively related to offshore financial centers. 
Additionally, as already mentioned, we also include in the regression the two income-related GVC 
indexes proposed:  
9. ,  is the income measure of country embeddedness of participating in GVC as 
defined in the previous section. One could expect this variable to be positively related to the bilateral stock 
of FDI between countries. In fact, the higher the participation of a given country in GVC, the higher one 
could expect the FDI entering that country to be, since FDI are at the origin of the implementation of the 
production stages in locations where the pay-off of the utility function of a given firm, considered interested 
in joining a GVC, is higher. 
10. ,  is the income measure of country net gains from participating in GVC as 
defined in the previous section. The inclusion of this explanatory variable will allow us to test if the degree 
of favorable or unfavorable participation in GVC of a given country, measured in terms of income transfer, 
is statistically related to the investment decisions made by firms at the micro-level. If significant, one could 
expect this explanatory variable to be negatively related to the bilateral stock of FDI between countries. 
The rationale is that the investment decisions made by firms at the micro-level would be deterred at some 
degree by the existence of sizeable imbalances in terms of net transfers of income due to GVC participation, 
which could be interpreted as a proxy for future macroeconomic adjustments in that economy. 
Note that correlation between EMBINCO and GOODINCO for the set of data analyzed was 
27.4%. 
We also introduced two set of dummies to capture time- and country-specific effects, namely: 
11. _ _2002 2012 are 11 time-specific dummy variables indicating the 
year t, ranging from 2002 to 2012; and 
12. _  and _  are 37 country-specific dummy 
variables indicating that a given country is origin (i) or destination (j) in that specific bilateral FDI stock. 
The high number of observations (10,968) allows for the inclusion of such a high number of dummies. 
We also tested other variables not included in Chakrabarti (2001)’s stock taking of explanatory 
variables of FDI, namely (i) the two partner countries belonging to the same Free Trade Area; (ii) the two 
partner countries having had a common colonizer, retrieved on 24 August 2015 from Mayer and Zignago 
(2011); (iii) the two partner countries having being a colony in the past, also retrieved on 24 August 2015 
from Mayer and Zignago (2011); (iv) , , defined as the join market size equalling ( 	 ; 
and (v) one of the countries being subject to main international sanctions. They were found to be statistically 
insignificant though. 
Finally, ,  refers to the disturbance term for the FDI stock from country j to country i at time 
(year) t. 
If we assume that the disturbances are uncorrelated through time and units, and, conditioned on the 
explanatory variables, identically distributed with a zero mean, this is a pooled regression model which can 
be consistently and efficiently estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)10. It is possible that other factors 
influencing FDI stocks from country j to country i are not included in the right-hand side of our explanatory 
equation. A part of these missing or unobserved variables can be assumed to be country-specific and year-
specific, expressing the heterogeneity between countries, but being constant over time, and expressing the 
heterogeneity between years, but being constant for countries, respectively. In such a case, the disturbance 
term ,  in Index 3 below can be written as  , 	 , , with the ,  zero mean, constant 
variance shocks uncorrelated across time and countries, the 	being the unknown individual effects to be 
estimated for each year, and  and being the unknown individual effects to be estimated for each 
country. 
                                                 
9 Namely Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta. 
10 Cf. Flôres et al. (2007). Even if disturbances are uncorrelated through time or units, one could overcome this difficulty by estimating 
a cluster-robust White’s variance/covariance matrix, as this would correct both for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. In such a 
case, the estimator would not be efficient, but it would be robust. 
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The individual effects may be either fixed or random. In the latter case, though the 	  must be 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, the errors in Index 5 above will be correlated within sectors. 
However, even when the random effects model is valid, the fixed effects estimator will still produce 
consistent estimates of the identifiable parameters11. Under the fixed effects assumption, Index 3 above can 
be estimated by OLS with country-specific dummies. 
We run several pooled OLS regressions by making use of software Stata SE 13 (64 bits). The final 
results obtained, after cleaning statistically insignificant variables are presented next (Table 6).  
 
TABLE 6 
RESULTS OF A POOLED REGRESSION MODEL TO ESTIMATE THE DETERMINANTS OF BILATERAL FDI STOCK 
WITH THE GVC-RELATED INDICATORS 
- Descriptive statistics - 











11211.72 37388.52 .001 645098 
GDPpcj 30412.48 19210.02 486.6405 113731.7 
GDPpci 28273.65 19596.4 486.6405 113731.7 
GDPj 1.46e+12 2.68e+12 4.30e+09 1.62e+13 
GDPi 1.39e+12 2.60e+12 4.30e+09 1.62e+13 
OPENNESSi 89.718404 53.318816 21 348 
OPENNESSj 89.718404 53.318816 21 348 
DIST 4682.915 4233.475 160.9283 17981.98 
CONTIG .071663 .2579409 0 1 
COMLANG_OFF .0619985 .2411639 0 1 
COLONY .0511488 .2203112 0 1 
OFFSHORE .1651167 .3713028 0 1 
Y2009 .097283 .2963563 0 1 
Y2010 .0982859 .2977144 0 1 
Y2011 .098833 .2984512 0 1 
Y2012 .0970095 .2559842 0 1 
PRC .0428519 .2025394 0 1 
EMBINCO .408573 7.945184 9.59e-06 240.3026 
GOODINCO .1998905 4.801704 -1.688337 146.4376 
 
- Econometric results- 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 10968 
Model 6.0868e+12 17 3.5805e+11  F(17, 10950) = 424.12 
Residual 9.2440+12 10950 844201779  Prob > F = 0.0000 
Total 1.5331e+13 10967 1.3979e+09  R-squared = 0.4971 
     Adj R-squared = 0.4964 
     Root MSE = 29055 
     LR Chi2 = 33493.48 















FDI Coef. Std. Err. t P>│t│ [95% Conf. Interval] 
CONST -12623.24 790.1637 -15.98 0.000 -14203.57 -11042.91 
GDPpcj 0.2956113 0.015863 18.64 0.000 .2638853 .3273373 
GDPpci 0.207731 0.0156834 13.25 0.000 .1763642 .2390978 
GDPj 2.65e-09 1.21e-10 21.81 0.000 2.41e-09 2.89e-09 
GDPi 2.03e-09 1.27e-10 15.99 0.000 1.78e-09 2.28e-09 
OPENNESSi 976.4987 26.4325 36.24 0.000 923.6337 1029.364 
OPENNESSj 815.9832 20.3251 31.32 0.000 775.333 856.6334 
DIST -.6380666 0.0769138 -8.30 0.000 -.7918942 -.484239 
CONTIG 11951.41 1632.534 7.32 0.000 8686.342 15216.48 
COMLANG_OFF 28825.74 1768.424 16.30 0.000 25288.89 32362.59 
                                                 
11 See Baltagi (2013). 
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COLONY 14769.5 1419.055 10.41 0.000 11931.4 17607.61 
OFFSHORE 1588.21 840.8849 1.89 0.059 -93.5598 3269.9798 
EMBINCO 5.21e-06 9.51e-07 5.48 0.000 3.38e-06 7.11e-06 
GOODINCO -6.49e-07 8.20e-07 -0.79 0.429 -2.29e-06 9.91e-07 
Y2009 -2103.569 404.809 -5.20 0.000 -2913.187 -1293.951 
Y2010 -1686.141 404.3867 -4.17 0.000 -2494.9144 -877.3676 
Y2011 -951.7249 424.9599 -2.24 0.025 -1801.6447 -101.8051 
Y2012 -1573.918 426.0642 -3.69 0.000 -2426.0464 -721.7896 
PRC 6611.089 2617.354 3.58 0.000 1376.381 11845.797 
Source: Authors estimations by making use of a pooled OLS regression, as explained above. 
 
The model is statistically significant and it explains around 50% of the variations in the stock of FDI 
between 2002 and 2012. The global model seems to be robust, as F-statistic is marginally zero. After having 
performed a Haussman test, which indicated that both the fixed effects and the random effect models can 
be used, we also run the Likelihood-ratio (LR) test for heteroscedasticity. The Chi2-statistic obtained was 
statistically marginally zero as well; so we conclude that there are no significant problems of this sort in 
the model. 
Explanatory variables generally behave as expected, according to Table 7 below. 
 
TABLE 7 
EXPECTED SIGNALS FOR SELECTED VARIABLES IN THE POOLED REGRESSION MODEL USED TO ESTIMATE 
THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI STOCK 
Variable Expected sign Observed sign 
GDPpcj + + 
GDPpci + + 
GDPj + + 
GDPi + + 
OPENNESSi + + 
OPENNESSj + + 
DIST - - 
CONTIG + + 
COMLANG_OFF + + 
CONLANG_ETHNC + + 
COLONY + + 
OFFSHORE + + 
EMBINCO + + 
GOODINCO - NS 
Source: + stands for significantly positive. - stands for significantly negative. NS stands for statistically insignificant. 
 
Positive correlations between FDI stock, in one hand, and GDP, GDP per capita, and openness, in 
the other hand, are confirmed. Adjacency and common languages between countries, as well as sharing 
former colonial ties, are positive determinants to FDI stock as well, as expected, as they work as proxies 
for proximity and familiarity factors that make investors feel comfortable about investing in adjacent 
countries, such as common legal, social and tax structures. Distance works on the opposite direction, as a 
proxy for remoteness factors that make investors feel uncomfortable about investment in environments 
where they feel unfamiliar with legal, social, and/or cultural rules. 
The five sets of remaining variables deserve particular attention.  
First, we must bear in mind that the OECD’s definition of FDI implicit to the data used in this thesis 
was still the one under the third edition of the OECD’s benchmark definition of FDI. That definition did 
not differentiate between sorts of transnational financial flows, including therefore productive or 
speculative, short or long run investment in the same level. That’s why one should not be surprised to find 
in OECD’s data that British Virgin Islands, Mauritius and Cyprus are, in this same order, the largest foreign 
direct investors in PRC, India and Russia. The last round of negotiations that originated the fourth edition 
of the OECD’s benchmark definition of FDI was concluded on 2008 but the OECD only started to publish 
data under new assumptions in September 2014 (see OECD 2008). Productive and medium- and long-term 
investments are certainly less sensitive to offshore financial centers than speculative and short-term 
investments. In fact, the lack of disaggregation between what one could call as financial FDI (portfolio, 
short-term, volatile investment) and productive FDI (used in industries, medium and long-term, stable 
investment) is particularly relevant for the “offshore” explanatory variable. One could expect this variable 
to have a significant positive impact on the financial FDI, meaning that offshore financial centers would 
stock higher levels of speculative FDI, but it would be expected to be insignificant or just slightly significant 
(positive) for productive FDI (e.g. through indirect links such as the recycling of some part of the stocked 
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financial FDI in productive activities). We found the offshore variable to be positive, but significant just at 
90% level, which is consistent in our view with the limitations of the OECD’s data of FDI bilateral stock 
referred above. One should note in this regard that OECD’s definition of FDI will evolve quickly to cope 
with the challenge posed by GVC, probably by differentiating both types of FDI, i.e. productive and 
speculative (see in this regard the recent first “OECD technical workshop on FDI and GVC” aiming at 
integrating FDI statistics into the analysis of GVC, held in Paris on October, 19 201512). This workshop 
and its impact will definitely open an additional vein of research in the core aim of this thesis. One could 
expect that better results would have been obtained for this model in terms of statistical significance if the 
dependent variable of FDI stock could be reformulated to separate speculative from productive FDI stock. 
Second, the EMBINCO variable, defined as the income measure of country embeddedness of 
participation in GVC, is significantly positive. Ceteris paribus, and assuming that the higher the 
transnational income generated between two given countries by GVC, the higher the FDI observed between 
those two countries, one could expect that EMBINCO variable to be statistically significant, underpinning 
the statistical linkage between FDI and GVC. Previous studies usually found openness variables (such as 
exports, imports or the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP) to be positive, although sometimes 
insignificant. We consider this EMBINCO variable, which we find to be positive and significant, to be a 
proxy to openness, but a particular one, openness (and country embeddedness) to GVC. 
Third, the GOODINCO variable, defined as the income measure of country net gains of participation 
in GVC, is not statistically significant. It means that we find no statistical relationship between an 
unbalanced transnational net transfer of income between two given countries (e.g. inflows much higher 
than outflows, or vice-versa) and the size of the bilateral FDI stock between those countries.  
Fourth, we found that the year dummies included in the model are statistically insignificant from 
2002 to 2008, but they are statistically significant from 2009 to 2012. The statistical significance of these 
years is particularly strong in 2009 (98%) and decreases from that year onwards (94% in 2010, 93% in 2011 
and 86% in 2012). The explanation for this result of the model is related in our view to the global financial 
crisis that emerged in 2009, after the filing for bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers in September, 15 2008. 
These four year dummies being negative and statistically significant at 90% could be interpreted as a 
consequence of the decrease in FDI stocks in result of that global financial crisis, ceteris paribus for the 
other explanatory variables of FDI stocks. 
Fifth, there is only one country dummy variable introduced in the model that is statistically 
significant: PRC. All things equal, bilateral FDI stock between PRC and any other 36 countries assessed in 
this model are, on average, USD 6.6 billion larger than other bilateral FDI stocks. The explanation for this 
result could emerge in our view from the outward bias of the PRC’s economy, deliberately promoted by 
the economic policies of the Chinese government, that creates relatively low levels of domestic demand, 
relative high levels of savings and a great deal of liquidity for investment (PRC’s hold nearly 40% of the 




We aimed to contribute to the new field of research that intends to bring up-to-date the tools and 
statistics currently used to look to the current reality given by GVC in international trade and FDI. We made 
use of the most recent data published by the WIOD to suggest two indicators of measuring the participation 
and the net gains of countries joining GVC in terms of income. All indexes found in literature merely cover 
the downstream approach, while the indicators proposed in this paper put both approaches (downstream 
and upstream) together. In addition, the proposed indicators are based on the actual use of the goods and 
services as inputs in the production process and not in its classification as intermediate or final goods or 
services. The first of these new measures proves to be statistically significant in explaining the bilateral 
stock of FDI in OECD countries, meaning that the higher the transnational income generated between two 
given countries by GVC, taken as a proxy to the participation of those countries in GVC, the higher one 
could expect the FDI entering those countries to be. 
The regression ran to test the statistical significance of that variable also statistically proves the 
negative impact of the global financial crisis that started in 2009 in the world’s bilateral FDI stocks and, 
additionally, the particular and significant role played by PRC in determining these stocks. 
Limitations of this study are related to (i) the narrow number of countries included in the WIOD 
(covering just 40 countries); (ii) trade in value-added being an estimate based on a number of assumptions, 





rather than a measurement, as mentioned by Escaith and Timmer (2012)13; (iii) IO databases published so 
far not considering at least second-round effects in the use of intermediates by GVC, i.e. the inputs used in 
the production of the inputs (which can also be in fact third and fourth and fifth and so on-round effects); 
(iv) the shortcomings of the methodology used to analyze the income transfer, namely the fact that the IO 
databases should be treated as an estimate based on a number of assumptions and intrapolations (most of 
the data results from interpolation by using national accounts and supply-use annual tables, since national 
IO databases are only available for 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2009), rather than a measurement, as mentioned 
by Escaith & Timmer (2012); and (v) OECD’s broad definition of FDI, since OECD’s definition of FDI 
does not differentiate between speculative and productive FDI stock and one should admit that determinants 
of both sorts of FDI stocks are different. Nevertheless, OECD statistics will evolve quickly to cope with 
this challenge. 
Finally, we identify several other veins for research, which can be tackled in future work, namely 
(i) the use of the coefficients obtained in the regression to predict the investment potential of countries, 
following an analogous methodology to that used by Proença et al (2008) for international trade flows; (ii) 
update the analysis with updated or new international input-output databases covering a wider number of 
countries, such as Eora Multi-Region IO database; (iii) individualize each one of the three regional value 
ladders14 identified by OECD et al (2014), Southeast Asia, North America and Central Europe, carrying 
out separate estimates for each one of these regions to see if they present some sort of differences; and, 
more ambitiously, or (iv) build more robust databases, for instance increasing raw data available per year 
and per country aiming at diminishing the number of inferences and interpolations, or including second- 
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